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All parties to this proceeding are listed in the caption. 
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I ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW || 
Petitioner submits the following questions to the Supreme 
Court for review: 
1. Has the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this case 
that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Court's power of supervision, when the Court of Appeals, in this 
case stated that petitioner's claim for permanent total disability 
compensation was cut off before that claim had actually accrued, 
thus, stating that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) is, de facto a 
statute of repose; nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. 
Vigos' claim because it was "bound to follow" the Court of Appeals' 
prior decision in Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 
1992), which decision some members of the panel disagree with? 
2. Is the Court of Appeals' decision in this case in 
conflict with prior decisions of the Supreme Court and other 
decisions of different panels of the Court of Appeals on the issue 
of whether there is continuing jurisdiction and how the Industrial 
Commission first obtains jurisdiction? 
| REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT || 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case was issued on March 
13, 1997 and is attached as "Appendix A". The Industrial 
Commission's Denial of Motion for Review, is attached as "Appendix 
B". ALJ's order is attached as "Appendix C". 
1 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeal's decision was filed on March 13, 1997. 
The time within which to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
expires on April 15, 1997. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
review the decision of the Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari 
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (1992), and pursuant to Rules 45-51 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1): 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an 
industrial accident, the employee shall receive 
compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent 
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as 
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 2 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration under 2 0 
C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), and (f) (1) 
and (2), as revised. 
2 
I l l ill till ' i ^ l r • 1 7 n i 1 \ : 
The powers and jurisdictioi i of the commissioi 1 ov er each 
case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice 
and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its 
former findings and order. Records pertaining to cases 
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other 
than cases of total permanent disability or cases in 
which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-99, may 
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(3): 
(a) "This section may not be interpreted a* modifying in 
any respect the statutes of limitations contained in 
other sections of this chapter or Chapter v. Title 3r», 
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 1 
(b) The commission has no power to change LIIL statutes 
of limitation referred to in Subsection ' -* in any 
respect. 
Utah Code Ann : 
A claim for compensation tor temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, 
permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the industrl ?! 
Commission within six years after the date of inc 
accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
jjkm N a t u r e Q £ UAAS_ C a s e y Couise ul Proceeding .and 
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disabled and had not performed any gainful employment as of January 
1, 1993. (R. 23-5) On July 10, 1995, 17 days after he received the 
social security determination, Mr. Vigos filed his application for 
hearing with the Industrial Commission for permanent total 
disability benefits. (R. 13). 
Pursuant to defendant's motion to dismiss, the ALJ dismissed 
the claim because it was filed more than six years after Mr. Vigos 
fell. (R. 61-2) Mr. Vigos disputed the ALJ's order and filed a 
Motion for Review within 30 days of the ALJ's Order and in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-82.53 (1) (1988) 63-46b-12 
(l)(a) (1992). (R. 64) On March 28, 1996 the Industrial 
Commission affirmed the ALJ's order. (R. 117-9) On April 25, 1996 
Mr. Vigos filed his Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. 
(R. 121) On March 13, 1997 the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Vigos' 
Petition. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Vigos was employed by defendant Mountainland Builders, 
Inc. (Mountainland) on October 13, 1988. (R. 1, 13) While working 
on a plank, Mr. Vigos fell and sustained several injuries, 
including a head injury, while acting within the course and scope 
of his employment. (R. 1, 13, 38, and 39) Mountainland's 
insurance carrier, the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah (the 
Fund), last paid medical expenses in July of 1989 and benefits from 
October 14, 1988 to May 8, 1989 as a result of this accident. (R. 
38, 39) Mr. Vigos was given neither an impairment rating for this 
4 
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Thei':- i.va,r-: d tcictiaal dispute as to when Mr. Vigos became permanently 
totally disabled because the Industrial Commission dismissed Mr. Vigos' claim 
without a hearing. Applicant asserted it was after the six year statute of 
limitations and defendants claimed it was about 4^ years after Mr. Vigos fell. 
The Court of Appeals determined that it was after the six year statute of 
limitations had run, although the Court of Appeals gave no explanation as to how it 
came to this conclusion. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals could have relied on 
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123, 124 n.2 (Utah App. 1992), which states 
that when the Commission dismisses a petitioner's claim without a full hearing on 
the facts, "we presume, to the extent necessary to resolve the issues on appeal, 
that the facts are as stated by petitioner." 
5 
denied after the October 28, 1994 request. (R. 30) Consequently, 
it is unclear as to when Mr. Vigos became permanently totally 
disabled. After a Social Security Administrative hearing in May, 
1995, Mr. Vigos was awarded Social Security benefits on June 23, 
1995 and the Social Security Administration determined that Mr. 
Vigos had not been gainfully employed since January 1, 1993. (R. 
23-25) On July 10, 1995, Mr. Vigos applied for permanent total 
disability benefits with the Industrial Commission. (R. 13) The 
Fund claimed that Mr. Vigos' application was filed after the 
statute of limitations had lapsed and moved for dismissal. (R. 39) 
On September 18, 1995 the ALJ dismissed Vigos' application with 
prejudice. (R. 61-2) Mr. Vigos filed a Motion for Review on 
October 16, 1995. (R. 64) On March 28, 1996 the Industrial 
Commission affirmed the ALJ's order. (R. 117-9) On April 25, 1996 
Mr. Vigos filed his Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. 
(R. 121) The Court of Appeals denied his Petition for Review on 
March 13, 1997. Mr. Vigos has timely filed this Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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I ARGUMENT J 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD 
BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THAT UTAH CODE ANN. §35-
1-99(3) IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE BECAUSE MR. VIGOS' 
CLAIM WAS CUT OFF BEFORE IT HAD ACCRUED 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FORCED TO FOLLOW A 
POOR PRECEDENT IN RULING THAT MR. VIGOS' COULD 
NOT BRING A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
The law is well settled in Utah that if a person's right to 
bring a claim is cut off by statute before that claim has accrued 
then the statute is a statute of repose. "A statute of repose . . 
. prevents suit a statutorily specified number of years after a 
particular event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action 
accrues." Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 
App. 1992); see also, Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985); Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252 
(Utah App. 1996); Hales v. Industrial ComnTn., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah 
App. 1993). A statute of repose violates a person's constitutional 
rights because it violates the due process provision and the open 
courts provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, §§ 7 and 11. 
In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
controlling statute "cut off petitioner's claim for permanent total 
disability compensation before that claim had actually accrued, 
i.e., before petitioner was totally disabled." However, because a 
different Court of Appeals' panel, in Avis v. Board of Review, 837 
7 
P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), had determined that the same statute was 
a statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals deemed itself 
powerless to rule otherwise in this case. The Court simply stated, 
"Whether each member of this panel agrees with the rationale and 
analysis of Avis is beside the point, as we are bound to follow 
this precedent," Therefore, the Court of Appeals rendered a 
decision in this case that has so far departed from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise 
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
B. UNTIL A PERSON BECOMES DISABLED HE CANNOT 
SUCCESSFULLY BRING A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: HENCE, 
DISABILITY IS THE LAST EVENT TO OCCUR IN THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-99(3)2, states: 
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, 
permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the Industrial 
Commission within six years after the date of the 
accident. 
Id. Permanent total disability differs from temporary total 
disability, temporary partial disability, and permanent partial 
disability because permanent total disability has an additional 
requirement before an injured employee can obtain benefits: the 
employee must suffer both an injury and the inability to work after 
medical stabilization. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1) states: 
Since Mr. Vigos' accident, this statute has been repealed; however, the 
current statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2), uses nearly the same 
language as Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3). 
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(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an 
industrial accident, the employee shall receive 
compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent 
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as 
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
revised. (Emphasis added). 
Id. The Commission sets forth the required "questions and 
evaluations to be made in sequence" for a claim of permanent total 
disability. The questions and evaluations are as follows: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful 
activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe 
impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the 
duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.15093, amended April 
1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 2 0 CFR Subpart P 
Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing 
past relevant work? 
5. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing 
any other work? 
Utah Administrative Code Rule R568-1-17. Consequently, as long as 
an employee is still working, despite his injury, he cannot apply 
for permanent total disability benefits because he is not 
statutorily disabled. 
The legislature did not intend to require an employee to file 
a claim for permanent total disability within six years of the 
"accident" if he did not meet the statutory requirements for 
§ 404.1509 states: 
How long the impairment must last. 
Unless your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or 
must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. We call this 
the duration requirement. (Emphasis added). 
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disability. To require an employee to file before he had a claim 
runs contrary to the statutory construction and well established 
Utah law. In Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 
1995), the Supreme Court stated: 
"'The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" . . . . 
Although we generally rely on the plain language rule of 
statutory construction, . . . . we note that an equally 
important rule of statutory construction is that a 
statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its 
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and 
with the overall legislative objective of the statute. . 
. . (Emphasis added and cites omitted). 
Id. at 2 68. The statute of limitations for permanent total 
disability cannot begin to run until the claimant has an injury and 
can no longer work. Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.42(d). 
In Larson's treatise, he states that a statute of limitations 
should not begin to run until a claimant is aware that he has a 
claim. Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.41 states: 
The time period for notice or claim does not begin to 
run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should 
recognize the nature, seriousness and probable 
compensable character of his injury or disease. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.42(a) also states: 
A rigid claims period may operate unfairly not only 
because the nature, seriousness, and work-connection of 
the injury could not reasonably be recognized by the 
claimant, or perhaps even by the claimant's doctor, but 
in many cases because the injury itself does not exist in 
compensable degree during the claims period. This latent 
or delayed injury problem presents in the sharpest relief 
the senselessness of uncompromising time periods. The 
classic illustration is that of the apparently trivial 
accident that matures into a disabling injury after the 
claim period has expired. A worker is struck in the eye 
by a metal chip, but both he and the company doctors 
10 
dismiss the accident as a petty one and of course no 
claim is made, since there is no present injury or 
disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops as 
the direct result of the accident. If the statute bars 
claims filed more than one year after the "accident," and 
if the court applies the statutory language with 
draconian literalism, the worker can never collect for 
the injury no matter how diligent he is: he cannot claim 
during the year, because no compensable injury exists; he 
cannot claim after the year, because the statute runs 
from the accident. (Emphasis added). 
Id. The language used by Larson applies to all "uncompromising 
time periods," not just a one year time period. Larson then uses 
a one year statute of limitation as "[t]he classic illustration . 
..." Larson is criticizing every statute of limitation that has 
uncompromising time periods, not just a one year statute of 
limitations. 
The Court of Appeals stated, in this case, that Mr. Vigos' 
claim for permanent total disability was cut off before it had 
accrued; however, because of the decision of Avis v. Board of 
Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of Appeals felt 
trapped and denied Mr. Vigos his rightful benefits. Any claim that 
falls under this statute or the current Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2), 
where the employee has a delayed onset of injury after the 
"accident" will make both §35-1-99(3) and §35-1-98(2) statutes of 
repose, especially if the Court of Appeals' decision in Avis and 
its progeny is allowed to stand, then the Industrial Commission 
will continue to interpret the statutes with "draconian 
literalism." 
Also, a claim for permanent total disability is more akin to 
a death benefits claim because the likelihood of delayed onset is 
11 
so great. In Hales v. Industrial Comm'n., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 
1993), the applicant claimed, and the Industrial Commission agreed 
with the applicant and stated in its order, "that the statutory 
provision in section 35-1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitution's 
open courts provision by extinguishing [the applicant's] 
constitutional right to litigate a valid claim before [the 
applicant's] right to file that claim arose." The Court of Appeals 
came to the same conclusion. Xd. at 542. That is exactly the 
issue in this case. It does not matter if Hales concerned a 
different statute or different benefits, which is the distinction 
the Court of Appeals tries to make. Mr. Vigos' right to litigate 
his valid claim was extinguished before his right to file the claim 
arose, which makes Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2) unconstitutional. 
The Court of Appeals has left Mr. Vigos with no remedy at all. 
Therefore, this Court should review Avis and its progeny and grant 
petitioner's writ of certiorari. 
POINT I I 
ONCE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION 
IT CAN MODIFY OR ADJUST AN AWARD IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH COULD 
INCLUDE A DETERIORATION OF THE FORMER 
EMPLOYEE'S CONDITION OR THE DISCOVERY OF A 
PREVIOUSLY UNNOTICED INJURY. 
When the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Vigos' p e t i t i o n , i t 
f a i led to discuss Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(1), which s t a t e s , "The 
powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the commission over each case sha l l be 
cont inuing." The Court of Appeals' decision in t h i s case i s in 
12 
conflict with prior decisions of the Supreme Court and other 
decisions of different panels of the Court of Appeals on the issue 
of whether there is continuing jurisdiction and how the Industrial 
Commission first obtains jurisdiction; therefore, this Court should 
grant the petition for writ of certiorari. 
The language in §35-1-78(1) is clear and unambiguous, once 
jurisdiction has been invoked over a case, the Industrial 
Commission has continuing jurisdiction over that case. In Utah 
State Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Notwithstanding the fact that the foregoing statutes 
[§§35-1-99 -100] require either the filing of a claim for 
compensation or the filing of a written notice of the 
accident in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, this Court has long recognized that a claim 
for compensation need not bear any particular formality. 
In fact, "great liberality as to form and substance of an 
application for compensation is to be indulged." However 
informal the claim may be, it need only give "notice to 
the parties and to the Commission of the material facts 
on which the right asserted is to depend and against whom 
claim is made." (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted). Although §§35-1-99 and 35-1-100 
were repealed and §35-1-99(3) controls in this case, §35-1-99(3) 
does not overrule Dutson. Dutson is still good law and it applies 
to this case. In Dutson the applicant had not filed anything with 
the Industrial Commission. However, in Dutson, the employer filed 
the "'Employer's First Report of Injury' . . . , the attending 
physician . . . filed 'Medical Report', . . . and . . . [the] 
State Insurance Fund filed 'Notice: Payment of Temporary Disability 
Compensation as per Utah Code (35-1-65) . . . .'" 
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The Commission has continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos' 
case for the following reasons: 1) the employer filed with the 
Commission an "Employer's Report of Injury" (R. 001, 035), 2) the 
treating physician filed a "Physician's Initial Report of Work 
Injury," (R. 034), and, 3) the Fund paid benefits to Mr. Vigos. 
(R. 39) In fact, in the Fund's Amended Answer to the Application 
for Hearing, the Fund stated, "The Workers Compensation Fund 
acknowledges the occurrence of Mr. Vigos [sic] industrial accident 
on October 13, 1988, but unfortunately it appears Mr. Vigos [sic] 
claim for additional benefits was not timely filed." (R. 39) The 
Fund then states, "The Fund originally accepted liability for Mr. 
Vigos' accident . . . ." (R. 39) 
Mr. Vigos acknowledges the language in §35-1-78(3) that states 
the Commission cannot modify statutes of limitations. However, 
this does not create a problem. If an employee has an accident and 
an injury, which does not have a delayed onset, notifies his 
employer, but fails to make a claim for benefits, then he cannot 
later try and make a claim through the "back door" by claiming 
continuing jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a timely claim has 
been filed and benefits paid, then the Commission has jurisdiction 
over every subsequent claim, regardless of the onset, and the 
statute of limitations does not apply. 
This is consistent with Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah 889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994), wherein this Court stated: 
Nevertheless, Stoker may still have a remedy under the 
Act. It would be ironic for the Act to be construed in 
such a fashion that a worker who undertakes a 
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conservative course of therapy within the time allowed by 
the statute, which if effective would save the Fund money 
and be less risky to the worker, would be denied benefits 
when that course proves ineffective and a more aggressive 
therapy must then be pursued, resulting in temporary 
total disability that occurs outside the eight-year 
period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken 
at the time of the less aggressive therapy, Stoker would 
have met the requirements for additional total disability 
benefits. 
Id. at 412. This Court then concluded that even though it was more 
than eight years post injury, the Commission had continuing 
jurisdiction and Stoker could file a claim under §35-1-78(1). Id. 
Additionally, in Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 
1996), in footnote 2, the Supreme Court stated: 
The provision granting the Commission continuing 
jurisdiction emphasizes the exclusivity of the 
Commission's jurisdiction over workers' compensation 
claims. Under general common law doctrine, the entry of 
a judgment for damages based on personal injuries would 
bar subsequent actions based on the same injury. Such is 
not the case under the Act. The Commission is empowered 
to adjust the award in accordance with changes in 
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78. Such changes 
could include a deterioration of the former employee's 
condition or the discovery of a previously unnoticed 
injury. See, e.g., Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund, 
889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994) (commission can reopen case 
if previously used conservative method of treatment 
proved ineffective); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943) (commission may 
reconsider case if there has been some new development 
that suggests award may have been excessive or 
inadequate); Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n/ 
60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611 (1922) (commission authorized to 
alter award when amputated leg failed to heal 
sufficiently to use prosthesis). (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 775. 
It would not only be ironic, but inequitable, for injured 
workers to return to the work force for six years or more and then 
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be told that they should not have made a good faith effort, but, 
instead, should have applied for permanent total disability. Such 
rulings will have a chilling effect on injured workers to return to 
the work force because they are punished, instead of rewarded, if 
they attempt to stay in the work force for more than six years from 
the date of the initial injury. Alternatively, workers may have to 
file for benefits before a claim has accrued, which then raises a 
fundamental question about Rule 11 sanctions for these filings. 
For example, suppose I have a client who is a truck driver and 
he was in a fight on May 21, 1992 while protecting his cargo.4 He 
gets severely beaten, suffers from post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and his employer denies benefits. I file an application for 
hearing for temporary total disability, permanent partial 
disability, interest, and medical bills, but I do not make the 
claim for permanent total disability because he has returned to 
work, even though he was given an impairment rating of 15% for his 
physical injuries and 15% for his PTSD. Now suppose this case goes 
all the way to the Court of Appeals, which grants the employee 
everything that was requested and this Court denies a petition for 
writ of certiorari. Next, suppose that four years post accident 
the employee has a relapse that results in him missing three 
additional months of work and this is medically attributed to the 
The facts of this hypothetical are based upon the case of Commercial 
Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994) . By citing 
these facts I am not trying to inappropriately supplement the record. With the 
current status of the Vigos decision applicant attorneys are placed in unenviable 
position of having to predict if a client will be permanently totally disabled 
before the six year statute runs. Naturally, if the attorney makes an incorrect 
evaluation, then the attorney could be faced with a malpractice claim. 
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May 21, 1992 accident; however, the employee again returns to work. 
Then suppose, the doctor gives me a letter in January, 1997, nearly 
five years post injury, that states, in essence: 
My prognoses for this gentleman is guarded, at best. 
Because he suffers from an extreme case of PTSD he may 
not be able to work again if he has another breakdown. 
He continues to drive a truck because he loves to drive 
and he finds comfort in being inside his truck. At the 
same time, however, the driving of his truck is a strong 
contributor to his PTSD. I will continue to see him once 
a month and I hope that he can continue to work. 
As the six year anniversary approaches I am placed in a very 
precarious position. Do I advise my client to continue working, 
which he loves to do, or do I tell him that he should quit, because 
if he has a relapse on May 22, 1998 his claim for permanent total 
disability is gone forever, even though the insurance company has 
paid all of his medical and all of his benefits? Another 
possibility is to go ahead and file simply to preserve the claim. 
Unless the Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction, 
claimants will be at a huge disadvantage. Such a situation runs 
contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling that: 
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed 
liberally to further the statutory purposes of providing 
relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents. . . 
. The Industrial Commission is in the first instance 
responsible for effectuating the purposes of the Act by 
construing its provisions to secure its humane 
objectives. (Cite omitted). 
Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, the parties clearly had notice of the 
material facts and the Industrial Commission was given notice. 
Once the employee meets this burden then the Commission has 
jurisdiction. Once it has jurisdiction, it can modify any prior 
17 
awards, which would include a "deterioration of the former 
employee's condition or the discovery of a previously unnoticed 
injury." Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996), 
footnote 2. 
When the employer has filed a first report of injury with the 
Industrial Commission, the doctor's first report of injury is also 
filed with the Industrial Commission, the insurance company accepts 
liability and then cooperates with the injured employee, there is 
no need to file a formal application for hearing. That is why 
Dutson is still good law and applies to this case. How else would 
the Industrial Commission ever get jurisdiction in a case where the 
employer and the employee are cooperating for a full six years 
after the Industrial Commission has been given written notice? The 
Court of Appeals' decision in this case would require an applicant 
to file a formal application for hearing on every claim, regardless 
of the cooperation between the parties. This is contrary to Utah 
law. see Stoker, 889 P.2d at 412. Currently, with this decision, 
the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction unless an 
employee files an application for hearing for every claim. 
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case goes far beyond 
the well established law of Utah concerning the purpose of the 
Worker's Compensation Act. In Norton v. The Industrial Comm'n., 
728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated, "[i]t 
need not be restated at great length that the Workmen's 
Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and that any doubt 
respective the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of 
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the iniured employee." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the 
Commission should have continuing jurisdiction in this case or else 
the statute will be construed so narrowly that Mr. Vigos will be 
left with no remedy. Hence, this Court should grant Mr. Vigos' 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) cut off Mr. Vigos' 
claim before it had accrued, the Court of Appeals, because it felt 
it was bound by Avis, states it is a statute of limitations. The 
Court of Appeals has made a distinction without a difference by 
stating that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) is a statute of limitations 
that acts like a statute of repose. It appears as though the Court 
of Appeals is stating, "It looks like a rose, it feels like a rose, 
and it smells like a rose; however, it must be a carnation." Yet, 
a rose, by any other name, is still a rose. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
99(3) looks like a statute of repose, feels like a statute of 
repose, and acts like a statute of repose; therefore, it must be a 
statute of repose and this Court must grant certiorari because Avis 
and its progeny are denying good, hard working people their 
constitutional right to pursue their benefits. 
Likewise, there must be continuing jurisdiction. If the 
Industrial Commission does not have continuing jurisdiction when 
the parties cooperate and the employer/insurance carrier accepts 
liability and pays benefits, then the Industrial Commission will 
never have jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Industrial Commission 
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will be deluged with claims even for the slightest of injury, 
simply to preserve any potential claims. Therefore, this Court 
should grant the petition for writ of certiorari because the Court 
of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's 
power of supervision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of April, 1997. 
EUGgtfE C. MILLER, JR. / 
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner 
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I hereby certify this 14th day of April, 1997 that 4 (to each 
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Certiorari were mailed by placing the same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Richard Sumsion 
Teresa J. Mareck 
Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0929 
Alan Hennebold 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
J. David Vigos, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah; 
Mountainland Builders, Inc.; 
and Workers' Compensation Fund 
of Utah, 
Respondents. 
FILED 
MAR 1 3 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 960283-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 3 , 1997) 
Original Proceeding in this Court 
Attorneys: Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Petitioner 
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Industrial Commission 
Richard G. Sumsion and Teresa J. Mareck, Salt Lake 
City, for Respondents Mountainland Builders and 
Workers' Compensation 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Employing the logic of Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 
537 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), it would be possible to conclude that 
the statute in issue here is a statute of repose because it cut 
off petitioner's claim for permanent total disability 
compensation before that claim had actually accrued, i.e., before 
petitioner was totally disabled. However, Hales concerns another 
kind of benefit and a different statute. Id. at 539. 
The case of Avis v. Board of Review. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), involves claims for permanent partial disability, id. 
at 585; essentially the same statute, id. at 586 n.2; and facts 
which, while different, are not legally distinguishable. See id. 
at 585. Whether each member of this panel agrees with the 
rationale and analysis of Avis is beside the point, as we are 
bound to follow this precedent. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). 
Avis concludes that the statute is a statute of limitations 
that runs from the time of injury, so long as petitioner knew of 
the injury, even the ah petitioner did not realize the extent of 
the injury and its permanent impact until the statute had run. 
Avi7. 837 P.2d at 588. Given Avis, we are obligated to affirm 
the Industrial Commission's order denying petitioner's motion for 
review of the administrative law judge's order of dismissal. 
Affirmed, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
J, DAVID VIGOS, 
Applicant/ 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN BUILDERS, INC. 
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
J. David Vigos asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judge!s dismissal of Mr. Vigos' claim 
for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
Is Mr. Vigos' claim barred by the statute of limitations found 
in §35-1-98(2) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The facts material to the foregoing issue are not in dispute. 
Mr. Vigos alleges an industrial injury occurring on October 12, 
1988. He filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits with 
the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995. 
* ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* Case No. 95-0597 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Since July 1 1988, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act has 
required injured workers to file their claims for disability 
compensation with the Commission within six years from the date of 
their industrial accidents. This statute of limitations, now found 
in §35-1-98(2) of the Act, provides in material part as follows: 
A claim for compensation for temporary total 
disability benefits, temporary partial disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or 
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the commission 
within six years after the date of the accident. 
Under the plain language of the foregoing statute, Mr. Vigos' 
claim was barred when he failed to file it with the Industrial 
Commission within six years from the date of his accident. The 
Industrial Commission is compelled to conclude, as did the ALJ, 
that Mr. Vigos claim must be dismissed. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Commission has 
considered Mr. Vigos' arguments, but finds them unpersuasive. The 
appellate decisions cited by Mr. Vigos were not decided under the 
provisions of §35-1-98(2) and are of no value as precedent in this 
case. As to the argument that the Industrial Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos' claim, such jurisdiction 
attaches only when a timely application for benefits has been 
filed. In this case, Mr. Vigos' application was untimely. 
Finally, with respect to Mr. Vigos' contention that the time for 
filing his workers' compensation claim was "'equitably tolled" while 
he pursued his right to Social Security disability compensation, 
Mr. Vigos admits that this principle has not been accepted before 
in Utah. The Industrial Commission declines to apply it now, since 
±t is directly contrary to the provisions of §35-1-98(2). 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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QEDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and 
denies Mr. Vigos' motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this^ff day of March, 1996. 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIgHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission within 20 days of the date of .this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0 
days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of J. David Vigos, Case No. 95-0597, was 
mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ X day of March, 1995, to 
the following: 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
364 0 AURORA CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124-
EUGENE C. MILLER JR. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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APPENDIX C 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 95599 
r^ir^i^r?rr'r'-
J. DAVID VIGOS, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS 
INC.,and/or WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 11, 1995 the applicant filed a claim for temporary 
total compensation and permanent total disability benefits in the 
above-entitled matter, alleging the same are the result of the 
industrial accident of October 12, 1988. Thereafter, the defendant 
raised the statute of limitations defense of Section 35-1-99(3), 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 99 requires that a claim for weekly 
compensation benefits must be filed within six (6) years of the 
date of the accident or the claim is wholly barred. In this case, 
the file indicates that the applicant was paid temporary total 
disability by the defedants for the period October 14, 1988 to May 
8, 1989. The defendants also last paid medical expenses for the 
applicants claim in July of 1989. 
Herein, the applicant filed his claims more than 6 years after 
the accident, namely on July 11, 1995, when the same should 
have been filed no later than October 13, 1994. 
Therefore, as a matter of law the claims for permanent total 
disability and temporary total disability benefits must' be denied 
as required by the foregoing statute, Section 99. 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for 
dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant 
for permanent total and temporary total disability benefits be, and 
the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice. 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
ORDER 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof# specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed this Order shall be final and not 
subject to further review or appeal. In the event a Motion for 
Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days 
from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this 18th day of September,1995. 
